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RECENT CASES

The clerical error involved in the instant case would seem to be a mistake
of fact which caused involuntary payment. Under those circumstances the
plaintiff would be permitted to recover in most jurisdictions unless refunds
were expressly forbidden by statute. The cases cited by the majority in support of their decision do not stand for the proposition that a mistake of fact
i a voluntary payment. Those decisions turned upon the negligence of the
taxpayer 14 and 'amistake of law.15 Obviously the county was not entitled to
the full amount of money paid. Even in Michigan the plaintiff would have
been entitled to recover the excess if the court had construed the payment
to be involuntary.16
GERALD W.
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Plaintiff, a paying patient instituted a suit against defendant nonprofit hospital for injuries sustained due to the negligence of defendant's em'loyee in permitting the patient to fall from a hospital bed furnished by the
defendant. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's overruling of
defendant's demurrer and held that a nonprofit corporation which had for its
purpose the maintenance and operation of a hospital may be liable for the torts
of its servants tinder the doctrine of respondeat superior. Avellone v. St.
John's Hospital, 135 N.E.2d 140 (Ohio 1956).
It is generally held that a charitable institution is liable for its torts,' but
immunity is usually granted to such institutions for the torts of their employees.2 Where third parties are involved an exception is sometimes made and
the institution is then held liable for their employees' torts.: In certain jurisdictions liability of the institution is based on whether or not the patient is
paying for the services; 4 other jurisdictions use the corporate negligence of the
institution in the selection of their employees as the basis for liability. 5
The rationale advanced in favor of immunity varies: (1) Some courts adopt
the trust fund theory, which is that the object of the trust fund of the charity
would become frustrated and ultimately destroyed if subjected to such liabi6
lity; (2) others argue that it would be against public policy not to allow in;munity,' because gifts to a charitable institution should be encouraged, but to
subject them to tort liability is to discourage potential donors,' furthermore,
PLOYEES. -

14. See Bateson v. City of Detroit, 143 Mich. 582, 106 N.W. 1104 (1906).
15. See General Discount Corp. v. City of Detroit, 306 Mich. 458, 11 N.W.2d 203
(1943).
16. See Blanchard v. City of Detroit, 253 Mich. 491, 235 N.W. 230 (1931)
("If
payment of a tax is involuntary, in absence of statutory provisions to the contrary, it may
he recovered although there is no express statutory provision therefore.").

1. See 3 Scott, Trusts, § 402 (1939).
2. Ibid.
3. See, e. g., Alabama Baptist Hospital Board v. Carter, 226 Ala. 109, 145 So. 443
(1933) (Wife of patient recovered for injuries sustained from fallingon hospital stairs).

4. See, e.g., Tucker v. Moblie Infirmary Ass'n., 196 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1914).
5. See Fisher v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hospital Ass'n., 137 W. Va. 723, 73 S.E.2d 667
(1952) (Corporate negligence may also include the purchase of any faulty equipment Dr
supplies by the institution).
6. See, e.g., Morton v. Savannah Hospital, 148 Ga. 438, 96 "S.E. 887 (1918); Greatrex v. Evangelical Deaconess Hospital, 261 Mich. 327, 246 N.W. 137 (1918).
7. See, e .g., Southern Methodist University v. Clayton, 142 Tex. 179, 176 S.W.2d
749 (1943); Weston v. Hospital of St. Vincent, 131 Va. 587, 107 SE. 785 (1921).
8. Jensen v. Maine Eye & Ear Infirmary, 107 Me. 408, 78 AtI. 898- (1910).
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any change in the immunity doctrine should come from the legislature and not
the courts; 9 (3) one court has reasoned that charitable institutions derive no
personal or private gain from the acts of thier servants and therefore they
should not be subjected to liability for their acts;1 ° (4) still other courts apply
the implied waiver theory that the patient assumes the risk of the employees
negligence, if reasonable care was used in the selection of the employees;".
(5) Louisiana favors the use of the public function theory, arguing that such
institutions are engaged in the performance of a public function, and there2
fore should be awarded-the same priviledges as other governmental agencies.'
It has also been held that attendants in charitable hospitals are not the servants
of the hospital under the master servant rule, but are the servants of the
13
patient while in his attendance.
The minority ruling is that a charitable institution is answerable for the
negligence of its employees and servants by the ordinary rules of agency, including the principles of respondeat superior. 1 4 It is apparent that this minority rule is becoming the modem trend. 15 The major reason for this transition
is that charitable institutions are more financially solvent today than they
were when, the immunity doctrine was instituted; 16 thus stare decisis is not
standing in the way of progress.
A logical result was reached by the Illinois Supreme Court, 17 holding that
Charitable institutions were liable for the torts of their employees, and that the
judgment could not be collected from the trust fund, but must be levied on the
profits. This decision could seemingly satisfy both the immunity and non imrtunity arguments by taking the "middle of the road" approach.
A case similar to the instant case has never been before the North Dakota
courts, but in view of the Supreme Court's opinion in the case of Rickbiel v.
Grafton Deaconess Hospital's it is suggested that they may follow the minority
rule. 19
ROGER L. HOLTE.
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DEVISED REAL PROPERTY. - Decedent cxecuted a will in which he made specific
devises of real property to the defendants. Subsequently he executed a contract for deed of the devised property. A declaratory judgment action was
brought by the executor to determine whether the devisees or the residuary
hlgatees receive the proceeds of the contract for deed. In reversing the Dis-

9. Forrest v. Red Cross Hospital, 265 S.W.2d 80, 82 (Ky. 1954)

(dictum);

Smith v.

Congregation of St. Rose, 265 Wis. 393, 61 N.W.2d 896, 898 (1954) (dictum).
10. See Morrison v. Henke, 165 Wis. 166, 160 N.W. 173 (1916).
11. St. Vincent's Hospital v. Stine, 195 Ind. 350, 144 N.E. 537, 540 (1924) (dictum);
Williams v. Randolph Hospital, 237 N. C. 387, 75 S.E.2d 303, 305 (1953) (dictum).
12. See lurjevic v. Hotel Dieu, 11 So.2d 632 (La. 1943).
13. See Basabo v. Salvation Army, 35 R. I. 22, 85 AtI. 120 (1912).
14. See, e.g., Swigerd v. City of Ortonville, 246 Minn. 339, 75 N.W.2d 217 (1956);
St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. St. Joseph's Hospital, 212. Minn. 558, 4 N.W.2d 637
(1942); Foster v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Vermont, 116 Vt. 124, 70 A.2d 230 (1950).
15. See, e.g., Noel v. Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 75, 267 P.2d 934 (1954);
Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital Ass'n., 43 Wash.2d 162, 260 P.2d 765 (1953).
(Since 1950 eight states have repudiated the immunity doctrine).
16. Hayes v. Presbyterian Hospital Ass'n., 241 Iowa 1269, 45 N.W.2d 151 (1950).
Durney v. St. Francis Hospital, 46 Del. 350, 83 A.2d 753. 758 (1950).
17. Moore v. Moyle, 405 11. 555, 92 N.E.2d 81 (1950).
18. 74 N. D. 525, 23 N.W.2d 247, (1946).

19. Id. at 258, 259, 260.

